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News Section

Loud Speaker of Appeasement: The elevation of Harold Stassen to the position of "Secretary of Peace and Disarmament" this week has not — indeed, far from it — disarmed his multitude of critics in Congress and the prospects of political peace about the matter are rated "zero."

The fact is that Stassen enjoys the dubious distinction (even among those who laugh at him) of ranking high among American apostles of appeasement. Stassen critics have all along attacked his "give-away" and "foreign handout" proclivities. But, now, those who don't like him relate his expensive generosity abroad to a matter more serious than the budget — namely, "disarmament." That includes atom power, the bastion of our security. (See Article Section of this issue, "They First Make Mad — International Control of Atomic Weapons," by Medford Evans, for dissection of the dangerous proposal for an atomic pool designed to share our atomic power with the rest of the world.)

Stassen, as merciless analysts see him, is close to those businessmen who, while essentially patriotic, nevertheless listen to the swan song of big contracts and business abroad, as promised by the internationalist politicos. There is fear here that the reckless Minnesota maneuverer will try to lead the U.S. into ventures not consonant with our defense security.

Experts on atomic power problems view with concern the recent statement of J. J. Hopkins, President of General Dynamics Corporation, who advocated building atomic reactors all over the world, among other places, in India.

In any case Stassen's career — or rather careering, as some put it — in the past few years has not been marked by caution concerning trade abroad in products useful to Soviet Russia.

Last year, before Congress, Stassen uttered in substance a strange doctrine, that internal unrest in Russia arose from lack of consumer goods and therefore American restraints on trade with Russia should be modified to alleviate it. The record shows that Stassen has constantly sought to break down the embargo on strategic goods against Soviet Russia.

Such ideas and actions of the recently appointed Secretary of Peace and Disarmament explain why people in Congress intend to give wary attention to the gentleman. His initial proposal in his new job, a new giveaway program of $8 billion for Asia, is said to be merely a promise of what is yet to come.

Whatever Stassen may actually accomplish in the next two years, there is no doubt that he has captured a powerful sounding board by his new position. And in a developing situation of international crisis, the words of the man from Minnesota will bear scrutiny.

Four Power Conference: Senator George has been playing politics — and not good politics — with his proposal for a Big Four top-level peace conference, say observers here. Stung by the revelation of Democratic leaders' errors at Yalta, the Georgia Senator sought to rehabilitate the "international get together" procedure right after the damaging revelations. His move swayed Eisenhower a bit, but not wholly. It had no restraining effect on Congressional leaders such as Knowland and Bridges.

The latter note that Soviet Russia now, since Malenkov's fall, distinctly does not ask for a Four Power meeting. And the British have apparently cooled to the notion. Finally, belief is widespread that such a gathering would be used by the Reds only to make us surrender more of the free world to their bondage. GOP Senate leader Knowland has served notice that he will continue to point the lesson of Yalta. Obviously at a time when the perils inherent in such conferences are vividly illustrated by the Yalta documents, the members of Congress are not inclined to "buy" the George idea — according to reports from the corridors of Congress.

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Yalta Papers: Far from being a fruitless excavation of 10-year old dusty documents, the publication of the Yalta papers has immense practical value today, say former U.S. diplomats here. One of these — Arthur Bliss Lane, former U.S. Ambassador to Poland — terms the publication an "implied repudiation" of Yalta, and adds that, if the Voice of America conveys this thought on the airwaves, it would have a "profound effect" on the peoples behind the Iron Curtain.

● **Along diplomatic row, there are expressions of horror and amazement that Alger Hiss played such a prominent role at the famous conference. Foreign diplomats note that he was listed as present at five of the formal meetings in the Crimea and at three of the secret meetings of the Foreign Ministers. At the latter, the vital diplomatic preparations were made, without which the big decisions could scarcely have been formalized, much less completed. He attended the meetings on the sell-out of Poland, on the proposals for dismembering Germany and on the United Nations — hardly unimportant issues. These foreign observers by reason of their professional experience on such occasions perceive very well the significance of the presence of such a figure as Hiss and they read with astonishment pieces in the "liberal" American press which seek to play down the role of Hiss in the proceedings.**

● American observers, after perusal of the documents, believe that Churchill — alone of the Big Three at Yalta — emerges with some prestige; at least, he is deemed to have been infinitely better than Roosevelt. The record indicates that the British Premier sought to head off actual dismemberment of Germany (although he consented to it in principle); and with the exception of Poland, clearly tried to modify Stalin's course of scornful treatment of smaller nations. Churchill — unlike the U.S. President — obviously entertained grave fears of the aggressive policy which Stalin — the British foresaw — would pursue in the post-war years and tried to save something out of the wreckage caused by Roosevelt's partiality for Russian aims.

● Roosevelt's weakness at Yalta has left many readers of the documents aghast. For instance, his interest in whether Russia was changing the German rail system to the Russian "broad-gauge" tracks appears childish and probably the source of embarrassment to the Russian and British participants. Washington observers, naturally, attribute his deportment (quite justifiably) to his rapidly declining state of health. And these observers draw two lessons. (1) That such top-level conferences should receive the early review of the Senate; and (2) the choice of a Chief Executive to run for election or re-election should be restrained by some estimate of his state of health. It is known that Democratic leaders were aware of the grave condition of Roosevelt when they ran him for his fourth term, in 1944.

● **British Conservatives, queried here, express the opinion that the publication of the Yalta papers is — contrary to reports in the "liberal" press — welcome in England, because: (1) they show Churchill in a comparatively favorable light; and (2) they unbare the truth about Roosevelt, too long regarded by the mass of the British public as a friend of Britain.**

● The omissions in the documents stir recollections. The veteran foreign editor of the Washington *Star*, Constantine Brown, writes: "Neither does there seem to be any account of the Big Three decision, over Churchill's strong opposition, to allow sending of several million Germans into the USSR for an indefinite time to work as slave laborers and repair the damage done by German armies. This reporter was unable to find such a reference. Yet the fact is that Stalin, who had heartily indorsed the Morgenthau plan making Western Germany into a pastoral state, demanded these millions of Germans. Mr. Roosevelt opposed this only mildly. His British colleagues talked in vain and at length about war ethics and slavery. Stalin was adamant and carried the day." Many more important records, it is believed, were censored in the publication.

Supranational Control of Trade: Looking down from the Senate Finance Committee bench, Senator Kerr (D., Okla.) on March 23 pointedly asked the Secretary of State whether he had found out yet who "leaked" to the *New York Times* the text of the Yalta papers. Dulles, uncomfortably surrounded by his inquisitors, did not plead the Fifth Amendment but just sat mute. He was more interested in a quite different matter. This was during the hearings on the bill, H.R. 1, the latest effort to extend the

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Hull-Acheson-Dulles trade program. Under Eisenhower leadership H.R.1 — assailed by many as destructive of numerous businesses — had barely squeaked through the House.

The program is running into rough waters in the Senate. Chairman Byrd extracted from Dulles the confession that the Trade Agreement Extension Bill is linked to the revision of GATT, recently negotiated at Geneva along with a projected Organization for Trade Cooperation. Protectionists claim OTC is another attempt to create international control of our trade. Byrd insisted his Committee — of which a majority already views with concern the trade program — would need to consider the OTC *before* deciding on H.R.1.

O. R. Strackbein, head of the most active nationwide protectionist group, this week warned senators that OTC and H.R.1 are "inextricably interwoven." And now — Byrd is warning — important senators don't want a supranational body to which we have to go, hat in hand, if we need to protect our industries. It's bad news for the President's trade measure when it runs into trouble with Byrd, who has been hailed as one of that measure's strongest advocates in the Senate.

Labor-Farm Front: Fortified by the impending merger, AFL and CIO have launched a campaign to organize in — of all places — the field of agriculture. The plan isn't as odd as it sounds, for some sections of the farm element are discontented — particularly the dairymen. Three methods are visible to those who watch the labor movements: (1) Organizing — there are reports of AFL attempts to line up under union banners the dairymen in northern Ohio and other spots in the Middle West. (2) Joint meetings — the CIO are prompting numerous joint meetings between union men and left-wing farm organizations, where much affectionate oratory is heard. (3) Logrolling on Capitol Hill — labor lobbyists in Congress have made some progress in getting members from agricultural areas to heed their plea to back labor's $1.25 minimum wage demand; in return, union lobbyists promise to back rigid 90 percent parity prices on farm products.

The pattern emerging from all this has a sinister aspect. In the past two months, the Communist press has been urging its followers to work towards formation of a "Labor-Farmer" party — naturally through the trade unions and the Democratic party. It is known that Reuther nourishes ideas of this nature. How successful the collaboration of labor and farmer members of Congress will prove on the minimum wage and 90% of parity issues will give an indication as to how successfully this leftist realignment will work out.

Alaskan Statehood: Although the House Committee on Insular Affairs has turned out a glowing report urging the admission of both Hawaii and Alaska to statehood, Representative John R. Pillion (Rep., N.Y.) of the Committee is vigorously opposed to admitting either Territory to the Union. Last week we reported his views on Hawaii in which he exposed the political power of Communism in that Territory. Pillion's objections to Alaska are on different grounds, and boil down to the proposition that it is too under-developed for statehood.

The Office of U.S. Delegate is the highest elective office in Alaska. In the 1954 election the total vote cast for this office was 26,999 out of an estimated civilian population of 132,000. Last year the inhabitants of the Territory paid only forty-eight million dollars in Federal taxes. It would, therefore, be unfair to the other States of the Union to allow Alaska two Senators in the U.S. Senate, elected by less than 27,000 voters and representing constituents whose total contribution to the heavy burden of Federal taxes was only $48,000,000.

The New York Representative warns against the dangers of partisan politics in the present effort to admit Hawaii and Alaska to statehood. In 1952 Republicans controlled the legislatures in both Territories and this fact incited some Republicans to advocate statehood in the expectancy of increasing party strength in the U.S. House and Senate. In 1954, however, Democrats won the Hawaiian legislature for the first time in its history, by a large majority. In Alaska the Democratic sweep was even larger. In consequence some Democrats are now thinking of statehood for Alaska and Hawaii entirely in terms of increasing their party's power in the U.S. legislature. Pillion urges that such a partisan approach to the problem be avoided.

He also points out that the Conference of Governors has definitely cooled on admitting either territory to statehood. From 1947 to 1952 resolutions favoring admission of Hawaii and Alaska to the Union were adopted. In 1953 a resolution favoring the admission of Hawaii alone was presented but failed to

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receive a favorable report. In 1954, no resolution for either Hawaiian or Alaskan statehood was even offered.

Education Front — How To Get Action: The State of Virginia has been stirred by the discovery that a teacher's manual of instruction in the primary grades contains un-American and socialistic passages, and by the prompt action of the Governor in recalling copies of the volume. In nearby Washington, those who watch the education field deem the incident not only a salutary warning to other states, but also a good object lesson of how to rid the nation's schools of such obnoxious matter.

As the Capital gets the facts, this is how it started. A group of mothers in Arlington, Va. (across the Potomac from Washington), discovered the following passages in the Manual entitled *Course of Study for Virginia Elementary Schools, Grade I-VII*, published first in 1934 and revised in 1943. One of the most objectionable passages reads as follows: "The material prosperity of the modern world has been attained under the capitalistic system. Capitalism is based on the principle of profit to the owner rather than service to the masses of the people. The methods of distribution of goods in a capitalistic society tend to direct social products into the hands of the few.

"Production is based upon the amount of goods purchasers can be induced to consume, rather than upon their needs. The capitalistic system is not planned and lacks direction: thus waste and economic cycles result. Natural resources are exploited for profit. The dependence of the laborer upon capital tends to reduce him to a servile status."

The ladies, including Mrs. Broyhill, wife of the district Congressman, had been fighting progressive education and socialism in the local schools. They brought the above passages to the attention of Mr. B. M. Miller, local businessman and leader in a movement to reform the schools. Mr. Miller wrote a letter to the Richmond (Va.) *News Leader*, describing the passages as "anti-free enterprise propaganda."

The Richmond paper printed Mr. Miller's letter and launched an editorial campaign, in which it said: "If this fantastic 'course of study' represents the economic thinking of our elementary school teachers, it is much later than many of us think. If the volume represents the subtle injection of propaganda by pro-Socialists in high places, let us know who they are! And if other such official guides to 'desirable patterns of behavior' are in use, now is the time to know about it."

The editorial of this influential paper roused Governor Stanley, who recalled copies of the manual and ordered the State Superintendent of Public Schools to revise the publication to delete the offending passages. Stanley also asked that it be ascertained who were the authors "of these wholly unwarranted and thoroughly alien passages and to determine whether they are now in the department's employ." He said he "would not want to see any department of our government keep in its employ those expressing these beliefs." An inquiry is now under way.

Book Front: The memoirs of Admiral Standley, announced for May publication (by Henry Regnery Company, 20 W. Jackson Blvd., Chicago, Ill.) are expected to throw more light on the decisions made at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. Standley served as Ambassador to Moscow, and had a record, rare among U.S. diplomats at that time, of insisting on American rights and interests. The Admiral also has a story to tell about the wartime efforts of Roosevelt and Adlai Stevenson (then in the Navy Department) to protect Communists in sensitive positions in the communications network.

● Devin-Adair Co. (23 E. 26th Street, New York) announces for April publication *France: The Tragic Years 1939-47*, by Sisley Huddleston, well-known British journalist. The author, a strong foe of the Communists, tells the true story of the seamy side of "liberation."

Letter from CLARENCE BUDINGTON KELLAND, novelist, Republican National Committeeman from Arizona: "HUMAN EVENTS is an eloquent voice in the wilderness of today's radicalism. I wish every American could read it weekly. If it could go into ten million homes in this land the word *conservative* would cease to be a term of opprobrium. You are a thumb in the dyke. May you persist through the night and hold back the waters of socialism until a better dawn shall come."

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Article Section

MAR 31 1955

"THEY FIRST MAKE MAD"

International Control of Atomic Weapons

By MEDFORD EVANS

I

Harold Stassen's new job as Presidential assistant in charge of disarmament, may be a way of providing for Harold Stassen. Little else can be said for it. The United States is ill-advised to promote disarmament talks at a time when only armament can offset hostile hordes of manpower.

The Soviet Union inspires hysteria over radio-active "fall-out" to promote atomic disarmament. They get enough aid from United States citizens without our giving a man Cabinet rank to coordinate the effort. The best that can be hoped is that so far as actual accomplishment goes, Mr. Stassen will continue as usual.

The isolationists have won a victory in principle. The United States will now go it alone. The recent UN London Conference on disarmament brought "no progress," President Eisenhower reported. Great Britain has decided to make H-bombs; France desires nuclear weapons. But, the United States will make a new effort to liquidate her own superiority. It is not without precedent that the Prime Minister of Great Britain should have made the only rational and courageous statement about the situation.

On March 1, 1955, Sir Winston Churchill asserted:

1. "The United States has many times the nuclear power of Soviet Russia. . ."

2. . . . "moral and military support of the United States and . . . possession of nuclear weapons of the highest quality and on an appreciable scale . . . is the policy which [Great Britain has] decided to pursue."

3. ". . . the nuclear superiority of the Western powers [must] be stimulated in every possible way. . ."

While Sir Winston was saying these things, which were noticed everywhere and nowhere seriously contested, the United States was still negotiating secretly to share with the enemy (over whom nuclear superiority is desired) the science and technology by which nuclear arms are produced, and trying to pool with that enemy significant quantities of the special material on which the manufacture of nuclear weapons depends.

The United States has offered to an international bank, in which Soviet Russia has been asked to participate, 220 pounds of plutonium, said to be "not of weapons grade." The material, this time, is not called "denatured." That word was already hurt when (1954) Robert Oppenheimer told the Gray Board: "I know of no case where I misrepresented or distorted the technical situation. . . . The nearest thing to it . . . is that in the . . . Acheson-Lilienthal report, we somewhat overstated what could be accomplished by denaturing." This time, no one has stated — over or under — what "not of weapons grade" might mean in practice.

The Prime Minister, however, has stated: "It is now the fact that a quantity of plutonium, probably less than would fill this box on the table — it is quite a safe thing to store — would suffice to produce weapons which would give indisputable world domination to any great power which was the only one to have it."

The Prime Minister did not say what such a box might weigh. It would probably weigh about a ton. The United States may have offered somebody a down payment on world domination.

This is one consequence of the "Atoms for Peace" plan in President Eisenhower's speech before the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953.

The President proposed a world bank of atomic energy. Nations with fissionable materials and scientific and technical information to invest would merge resources in a pool from which needy nations could borrow. Power development would be emphasized and construction begun in "power-starved areas." The United States, Great Britain, Canada and the Soviet Union would contribute according to their abilities, and China and India would receive according to their needs. The atomic weapon would be taken "out of the hands of the soldiers" and put "into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace." "Private conversations" between representatives of the powers would settle the practical details.

Almost at once the Soviet Union announced its "readiness to take part in such negotiations," and a series of secret talks began between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Soviet Ambassador Georgi N. Zaroubin, once Igor Gouzenko's boss in Canada. The talks have presumably not been concluded. They are still secret.

II

U.S. participation in an atom pool is radically wrong for two reasons: (1) it undercuts, confuses and eventually destroys our whole defense program; and (2) it not only fails to establish a basis for negotiating international differences, but actually inclines to provoke new differences and aggressions.

The atom pool makes our defense program seem either silly or wicked. In order to arm effectively it is necessary to keep clearly in mind at all times how and why we are to make the effort required.

The *why* is the logical and widely held belief that Communism is essentially an implacable commitment to world power, that the U.S.A. is the principal obstacle in its path, and the USSR is the main bulldozer in its possession.

The *how* is the New Look in the Pentagon (also an Eisenhower creation) based on skillful use of air power and atomic weapons, to compensate for inevitable inferiority in manpower and to permit economies.

People could understand Senator Margaret Chase Smith when she said, "My answer to the big question of 'how can we get more defense for less spending' was this: we have developed and are developing atomic weapons other than just the bomb that will provide much greater destructive power or defensive power if you prefer to put it that way, than weapons of the past."

People can understand that, but they cannot understand a proposal to share the revolutionary materials and information which make this kind of defense possible with the only potential enemy who makes any large-scale defense necessary.

If the Russians are the kind of people with whom we can cooperate in an atomic energy laboratory, then they are not the people against whom we should spend $60 billion a year.

There is no point in saying, "Oh, the laboratory will be devoted to peaceful developments." Our best scientists have repeatedly assured us that practical developments coming out of a research laboratory are unpredictable. "Scientific research can flourish only when it is done for its own sake and not with consideration of its practical application," Dr. Albert Einstein said in an interview with the *Washington Post* (published August 3, 1947.) Dr. Einstein's own historic role

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in the development of the atomic bomb, which he did not at all anticipate when he formulated "E = mc2", is probably the most famous illustration of the fact that research scientists do not know what the practical consequences of their researches are going to be.

Thus, if we went into an atomic research laboratory with the Russians we would have no way of predicting or controlling the practical developments that might occur. "The whole history of science shows," Dr. T. R. Hogness has said, "that the great boons to humanity which science has produced came, not as a result of a direct search for them, but rather as by-products of a much wider search — the search for knowledge, for understanding of nature, for truth itself."

Dr. John R. Baker has said: "No planner could make the right guesses."

By the same token, of course, no planners can confine the results of an international atomic energy laboratory to "peacetime uses of fissionable material." They cannot do that anymore than Dr. Frederic Joliot-Curie could prevent his own researches from being of great value to the military establishment of the United States.

About the only plausible generalization suggested by history concerning the probable by-products of research is that military applications seem to come a bit sooner than civilian, presumably because it is easier to destroy than to build. It is a long road from the uncontrolled explosion of a 16th-century petard to the controlled explosions in a twentieth-century Cadillac.

Another feature of research is that one observer of an experiment may get an idea missed by others, and the members of a partnership may have different degrees of success in exploiting a common discovery. The discovery of fission in Germany in 1938 was exploited by the U.S. over Japan in 1945. If atomic information had not been pooled (by free publication and exchange of information) down to World War II, the A-bomb probably would not yet have been developed. It happened that we got it, but we got it by virtue of previous international cooperation, and specifically by virtue of an experiment performed in an enemy country.

Our scientists quickly recognized that this was a two-way street and cut off publication and exchange of information to keep Germany from learning from us as we had learned from her. That may seem ruthless, but we recognized the hostility between us and the Nazis and concluded it was unwise to collaborate with them. There is nothing in nature which says that in a common atomic laboratory with the Russians we might not miss the significance of a discovery which they would get. Likewise, they might miss something we saw.

It is assumed, however, that we have at present more to contribute to the joint venture than they have. This means we have to assume good faith all round to go into the thing at all, while they might be going into it for what they could get out of it. If we are trusting and they are not, then we will lose relative advantage and they will gain.

No one can predict with certainty what will happen if we go into an international laboratory with the Russians, but if the assumptions on which our defense program is based are correct, then in this venture we may look a lot like the young lady of Niger,

"Who smiled as she rode on a tiger.
They returned from the ride
With the lady inside,
And a smile on the face of the tiger."

On the other hand, if past assumptions of implacable Communist hostility are wrong, then we should frankly admit it, and reduce our military establishment to the modest dimensions required for occasional police actions in a world where the great nations are united. To try a joint venture with the USSR into the most sensitive and hazardous nuclear researches, and simultaneously to maintain unilaterally a crushing burden of arms against the USSR, can only mean the dissolution of military and civilian morale in the United States.

A few Americans think we dealt harshly and dishonorably with the Canadians and the British in 1946 when we cut them out of our main atomic program, in which they had originally been full partners. Whether we were right or wrong in this, the fact that we did it should remind us that the Russians could conceivably do the same thing to us. They could cut us out of any atomic laboratory in the Eastern hemisphere.

III

This danger is increased by the fact that the Eisenhower plan ignores the distinction made by the Acheson-Lilienthal plan between "safe" and "dangerous" activities. Recall that the essential feature of the Acheson-Lilienthal plan was the establishment of an international Atomic Development Authority at all times in control of the atomic-weapons potential of the world, through monopoly of all "dangerous" activities—*i.e.*, those which might lead to the clandestine production of weapons. Other activities, more remote from weapons production, were to be labeled "safe" and left to the individual nations. The Acheson-Lilienthal report emphasized the importance of this distinction, and indeed rested its claim to practicability largely on the assumption that the "dangerous" activities could be readily identified and confined to installations owned and operated by the international Authority.

The Eisenhower Plan is supposed to be the reverse of the Acheson-Lilienthal plan so far — but at this point it would be helpful to amend the terminology. Responsibility for both plans was, of course, divided. But, in the main, both plans were due to Robert Oppenheimer. At any rate that is the published opinion of men like Eugene Rabinowitch and Ralph Lapp, who in this sort of thing probably know what they are talking about. Accordingly, I shall call the Acheson-Lilienthal plan "Oppenheimer Plan I," or "Op I" for short, and the Eisenhower plan "Oppenheimer Plan II," or "Op II."

Oppenheimer Plan II is supposed to be the reverse of Oppenheimer Plan I as far as the assignment of unquestionably dangerous activities is concerned. That is, under Op II the international Agency would be dependent while the national projects would remain independent. But though this reversal of Op I is implied by Op II, the latter actually ignores the distinction between safe and dangerous activities. It not only ignores the verbal distinction, but by its emphasis on atomic power insures that the distinction would be difficult or impossible in practice.

It may be presumed, therefore, that the international Agency will engage in dangerous activities. At the same time dangerous activities will certainly continue to be carried on by the individual nations. Thus a continuous transmission belt of dangerous activities from nation to Agency to nation will be established. The result will be not an armaments race with defined lanes for the runners, but an armaments scrimmage in which the spectators and many of the participants will never know who has the ball.

"For every kilowatt generated in safe reactors," says Op I, "about 1 kilowatt must be generated in dangerous ones."

"A special purpose," says Op II, "would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world." But the plan makes no reference to the problem of where the safe kilowatt would be produced and where the dangerous kilowatt would be produced, and what would be the connection between the two.

Op II does say, "The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material [as proposed] can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure." But this somewhat starry-eyed protestation leaves many questions unanswered. Who are "our scientists?" American only? If so, how do we know the Russians will not outwit them? On the other hand if Russian scientists are included in the first place, then against whom are the safeguards provided? In either case what is the basis for the assertion that essential immunity to surprise seizure can be built into an atomic development installation?

One is reminded of the hopes aroused by the use of the term "denaturing" in Op I, and of the somewhat embarrassing

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supplement released about two weeks later, with the statement: "Denaturing, though valuable in adding to the flexibility of a system of controls, cannot of itself eliminate the dangers of atomic warfare." There is, of course, no way to make an alloy of one part plutonium and one part international idealism, or one part U-235 and one part national loyalty.

Enrico Fermi once said, "There is no denying the fact that the possible use of plutonium for aggressive warfare constitutes a difficulty for the industrial uses of atomic energy that is much greater than any technical difficulty that we can foresee. The problem of preventing this use is essentially political and not technical." Surely it must be disturbing that a political leader like President Eisenhower should so blithely consign to "our scientists" a problem that one of the greatest of scientists has said is essentially political.

While Op II is inferior to Op I in the matter of definition of safe and dangerous activities, in a perhaps yet more basic matter the two are alike. That is in their common adherence to a doctrine of "strategic balance." It is an assumption of each that what is desirable is an even distribution of power throughout the world. The acceptance of this assumption is what makes it so vital to those who do accept it that neither the national nor the international agencies should be in military hands. For it is of course a very rare soldier who is able to understand that it is just as important not to have an advantage over your enemy as it is for your enemy not to have an advantage over you. This is not because soldiers are unintelligent, but because the idea is so extraordinary.

It is not the Christian idea of loving your enemy, for it is not advanced on a Christian basis. If it were advanced on that basis, then a great train of consequences would ensue, far other and more important than any so far considered. Suffice it to say that while the duty of Christian love may or may not involve the perfect renunciation of force — we think it does not — it can never be reasonably construed to involve building up adverse forces. Our Lord enjoined Peter to put up his sword, not to make sure that the high priest's servant had one just as sharp. (Also before we take it for granted that Christ taught pacifism we should digest the injunction recorded in Luke 22:36 — "He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment, and buy one.")

Certainly the Soviet oligarchy has never shown any signs of understanding a policy of strategic balance. We affect impartiality, they are frankly partial to their own interest; the resultant is of course not neutral but in their favor.

The particular application of the principle of strategic balance emphasized by Op II is in the field of electrical energy. The international Atomic Energy Agency is to "provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world." This means China and India. The Indian physicist Professor Megnad Saha, as cited by the British physicist Professor P.M.S. Blackett in *Fear, War and the Bomb*, "estimates that per capita energy available in India, from other than human labor, is about one-sixtieth of that available in America." It is small wonder that India's UN delegate Krishna Menon listened with such rapt attention to President Eisenhower's proposal. What is not so clear is why any power plants, which rational benevolence would lead us to subsidize in such a power-starved country, would have to be atomic power plants. If they need power so badly, and it is really our duty to see that they get it, there ought to be quicker ways than experimentation with fissionable materials.

The case of China is more difficult yet. It is certainly a power-starved area. Blackett estimates its current resources as only slightly more than those of India. Should we participate in the construction of atomic power plants there? The suggestion has been made at least twice in the past.

In December, 1945, Dr. Oppenheimer told the Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy that "if in China, where I understand we are prepared to help with the generation of power in the Yangtze Valley, it were possible and sound to establish atomic power, it would be a very good thing to do that through the UN Commission." And later the same month, at a round-table conference sponsored by the Institute of Pacific Relations "a scientist who had worked on the bomb" declared, "One operating uranium pile in China might be convincing testimony to the Chinese, as well as the rest of the world, that we do not intend to monopolize atomic power for our own selfish national interests."

What about Russia itself? It is a power-starved area compared to the United States. Should not the first concern be to establish a balance through equalizing these two nations? Blackett has written: "It is true that the development of atomic power may prove a long project. But the Soviet Government is in the habit of taking long views. On any hypothesis, the bridging of the gap between the power resources, and so the standard of living of the USSR and America . . . must take a long time. Any conceivable way of shortening this time is likely to be seized upon with avidity." That is credible.

The case against strategic balance can be stated simply. Atomic warfare is not a sport in which fair play requires us to arm our enemy, and fissionable material is not a crust of bread or cup of water which in charity we should distribute to friend and foe alike.

Operating an atomic laboratory with power-producing quantities of fissionable material is like driving a nitroglycerine truck or running a cobra farm. It is tricky business, and you don't want to go partners with just anybody.

To ask the American people to go partners in this kind of business with a power which they believe is their mortal enemy is to invite paralyzing confusion. In this frame of mind you cannot fight, you cannot prepare to fight. This is to stare frozen at the snake.

IV

Of course, if the plan succeeds diplomatically, we can afford — we would even welcome — the relaxation of our own military potential which it involves. We would see the same relaxation in the Soviet Union and Red China. Diplomacy is always better than war while it works, and unless there is some probability of war there is no need for a military establishment. So if you could always be sure of your diplomacy you would do well to eliminate your armed services.

But then your diplomats themselves need a threat somewhere in the background. They need to "negotiate from positions of strength." If they negotiate the strength away they are soon through negotiating. So it is not altogether simple. The diplomatic consequences of the proposal to create an atom pool, and of the pool itself if it is created, are more difficult to estimate than are the military consequences.

Diplomacy may seek two kinds of effects. It may be genuinely pacific, or it may be itself a kind of psychological warfare, aimed at putting the enemy at a disadvantage without the pain and expense of shooting, bombing, etc. No one measure can be seriously intended to simultaneously placate and embarrass an enemy. The Eisenhower plan has been praised for doing both but is not well adapted to do either.

The Trojan War began when the goddess of discord tossed into a feast of the gods a golden apple inscribed "for the fairest." It is the nature of a prize to inspire contention. The first prize established by the Eisenhower plan would be the international atomic laboratory itself. We have already noted how national representatives might take from such a laboratory the militarily valuable information and materials which might be generated there. The value might be commercial, and still tempt the partners to try to outwit each other in their manner of taking it out of the business for their individual benefit. Such things have been known to happen.

So long as each thought he was winning this contest of wits the surface would be preserved, but if one of the partners decided he was losing he might be provoked into attempting seizure or destruction of the atom pool itself. At any rate such a pool is not merely a place where "the great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West," may cooperate; it is also something else for them to fight over.

But the feature of the plan which would most notably provoke aggression is the provision for building atomic power plants

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in "power-starved areas." We have already from time to time expressed fears that the Communists might take aggressive action in India. How much more would they be tempted if to the human resources of India were added one or more atomic power plants! Red China is said to be now in possession of arms and commodities which we gave Chiang Kai-shek. How long would Nehru be likely to retain independent possession of a power-and-plutonium-yielding nuclear reactor?

Renunciation of a claim is often the way to peace, but renunciation of a responsibility more probably leads to disorder and strife. In October, 1945 President Truman referred to the atomic bomb as a "sacred trust." For this he was ridiculed in some quarters, but the danger we now face is due to failure to live up to that trust, not to recognizing its existence.

V

If this "Atoms for Peace" plan be regarded not as a sincere attempt at peacemaking, but rather as a maneuver in the psychological war, it is still not well advised. It is not good propaganda for the U.S.A., for the simple reason that it makes the USSR sound quite rational by comparison. Consider the two positions as follows:

(1) President Eisenhower says, "The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon for the benefit of all mankind." In the same speech he says, ". . . the United States' stockpile of atomic weapons . . . increases daily. . . . The development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services."

(2) The Soviet Union might well say to that, if reversal of a trend of atomic military build-up is what you want and you have yourself a stockpile that increases daily, then surely you have it in your own power to reverse the trend. Why don't you reverse it? The Soviet Union does say: "If some small part of atom material is to be directed to peaceful aims while the main mass of the materials — the quantities of which are constantly growing — is to be directed to the production of more and more atomic weapons, then the threat of atomic war will not lessen in the least. . . . It is necessary that not some part but the whole mass of atomic material be directed completely to peaceful aims, which would open up unheard-of possibilities for the progress of industry, agriculture and transport, for the employment of the most valuable atomic discoveries, for the improvement of machines in many fields of their employment and for further and higher progress in science."

How do we answer them? Do we tell them we cannot direct all our atomic resources to peacetime uses because we do not trust the Soviet Union? They may say to us: Look, you brought up the subject. Your President is the one who said: ". . . allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first, rather than in building up the armaments of war." Did you mean it or didn't you? The Soviet Union may well say it to us. They do say:

"The Soviet Union is deeply convinced that mankind must and can be spared the horrors of an atomic war. Special responsibility for the solution of this problem rests with those states which already possess the power of atomic weapons." The United States is the power which by its own admission has given atomic weapons virtually conventional status within its armed services. "Is it possible," asks the Soviet Union, "to speak of the necessity of easing international tension and at the same time to pass by the problem of prohibiting the atomic weapon?"

And the best our Secretary of State can do by way of reply is to say in effect, "Oh, you misunderstood us, but come, let us talk about it privately, lest the citizens of the world overhear us." Mr. Dulles' exact words: "The Soviet Union seems not to have caught the spirit of the President's proposal. Its very purpose was to find a new and clearly feasible basis which will permit of actually getting started. It has long been evident, and the tone of the Soviet response makes it even clearer, that little can be achieved by the continuance of public debate."

Mr. Dulles may say if he likes that the Soviet Union does not understand. But if the representatives of the Soviet Union are trustworthy men, then their logic is inescapable. And if they are not trustworthy, we have no business going into private negotiations with them.

The fact is we are now conducting such negotiations. Dulles and Zaroubin are discussing secretly the proposal to pool atomic materials and information, and the Soviet counterproposal to outlaw atomic weapons. By the time public debate is reopened — in order to get the Congressional approval which the President said he was sure of — we may be sure a provisional arrangement will have been made from which we can retreat only with monumental embarrassment and into which we can advance only with final recklessness. We may be sure of this because the commitments implied by the Eisenhower speech of December 8, 1953, are themselves either to be broken with chagrin or kept with peril.

If we agree with the Soviet Union that neither is to use atomic bombs, it is probable that they will keep their word. Then we would surely keep ours, and the result would be the loss of our equalizer. If we continue these negotiations we shall hardly avoid making some kind of pledge not to use the bomb. Propaganda which involves us in this train of consequences is not good propaganda.

When I was an English teacher I occasionally got themes which made just no sense at all. And from students who could talk quite sensibly in the hall, who were certainly neither morons nor *avant-garde* artists.

The only explanation that ever seemed plausible occurred to me when we were studying *Paradise Lost.* They couldn't understand it. It just did not make any sense to them. Then I thought: Well, that's it. They are good kids. They have been told Milton is great and they believe it. But Milton does not make any sense. Therefore the way to be great is not to make any sense. They think: *This English teacher is O.K. Anyhow, he dishes out the grades. You got to give him what he wants. He seems to like Milton, who obviously makes no sense — so, you give the English teacher a theme that makes no sense. Maybe it's great. Maybe he'll like it. It's a shot in the dark, but what you going to do?*

Something like that is the only possible explanation of the American public's acceptance in principle of the proposals that have been made for international cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of atomic energy. From the point of view of the United States such proposals make no sense at all and never did make any sense. Apparently the majority of the American public still believe that nothing connected with atomic energy is *supposed* to make any sense. So long as we assume that, we will probably go on allowing our policy to be determined by certified security risks and propagandized by their journalistic and broadcasting associates.

Unless Mr. Stassen has a suggestion.

Mr. Evans had eight years service with the Atomic Energy Commission, ending as Chief of Training. As part of his position he was specifically asked to give his time to the problem of security education and training. He resigned in March, 1952, only when he found none of his recommendations were being acted on. He is the author of *The Secret War for the A-Bomb* (Regnery, 1953). At present Mr. Evans is editor of *Facts Forum News.* He has previously contributed to HUMAN EVENTS ("Mental Behavior in the Atomic Scientists"—January 8, 1955).

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